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I. INTRODUCTION(1!NE FACET of the social upheaval rampaging across American
society within the last decade has been the challenge to the ex-
pansive power wielded by large private and quasi-public organiza-
tions over their members and over other individuals and groups.'
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structures and goals, and more
There has been an increasingly
vocal demand that this power
be exercised in a fair manner
to achieve justifiable ends. Al-
though men may quarrel over
the propriety of means and the
definitions of ends, the signifi-
cance of this development lies
in the questioning of existing
particularly in the challenging of
the assumption that organizations outside the formal structure of
government should be largely free of legal restraints.2 Yet this
freedom has been checked where forces have organized in defense
of those subject to organizational control. For example, we are
familiar with the struggle waged by the labor movement in America
against the corporate powers of the capitalists. But in the field of
education, especially at the university level, little internal resistance
has been manifested, at least until recently. Public and private uni-
versities traditionally have sustained the more or less unbridled ex-
1 See Developments in the Law - Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 987, 989 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. See also
Latham, The Commonwealth of the Corporation, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 25 (1960); Schwartz,
Institutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness, 55 Nw.
U.L REV. 4 (1960).
2 Early in this century, one school of political thought, the Pluralists, evaluated the
role of private organizations in modern society and concluded that their autonomy from
state interference was essential in achieving "the common good" for society and its
individuals. See, e.g., J. FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 18-22, 32-39 (2d
ed. 1914); H. LAsKI, STUDIEs IN LAW AND POLITICS 249-50, 259 (reprinted ed. 1968);
Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARv. L. REV. 404, 424-26 (1916). See gen-
erally Developments, supra note 1, at 986-87.
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ercise of their disciplinary authority under the rubric of in loco par-
entis, accepting as correct and desirable their roles as parents to those
under their control. But the growth and increasing impersonality
of large-scale organizations, coupled with the increasing recognition
of the helplessness of those governed by these organizations, have
led to protests, sometimes of violent magnitude, and to a myriad
of proposals for imposing legal and other practical controls over the
way power is assigned, organized, and exercised.
Today there is a growing and sustained debate about both the
procedures and the ultimate ends and values of social and economic
institutions, which finds a counterpart in recent American history
only in the years of the Great Depression.4  Other industrialized
democratic nations are experiencing the same phenomenon - a mas-
sive challenge to the styles and goals of private and quasi-public
institutions and their exercise of power over the individual. One of
the key objectives in this challenge is the restoration of the ancient
philosophical goals of equality and justice to a central place in
modern society.5 The search for justice may be viewed as requiring
a reexamination of means and ends. Such a reexamination is dearly
taking place in our system of criminal law and procedure. In recent
years many changes have been made, ranging from the institution
of greater controls over pretrial police practices to the adoption of
less retributive and more rehabilitative measures for dealing with
convicted criminals.
Within the context of higher education, the challenge has been
directed toward the traditional relationship between the student and
the institution. American universities and colleges, both public and
private, have until quite recently assumed a parental attitude toward
students.' This was especially true of the residential institutions,
which, unlike most of their European counterparts, bore a variety of
responsibilities toward students, including inculcating proper moral
and social attitudes, sheltering them from various dangers, and min-
istering to their physical and spiritual needs - in short, behaving
as a surrogate parent. In return for this, the student was expected
8 See authorities cited note 6 infra.
4See J. HicKs, G. MowRY & I. BURKE, THE AMERIcAN NATION 540-44 (4th ed.
1965).
5 Cf. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA o PROGRESS 13 (1970).
6 See Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928);
Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923) (per cur-
iam); Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced - Guidelines for University Dis-
ciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L REV. 301, 310-12 (1968).
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to show respect, if not indeed gratitude, to mind the rules, and to
confess errors when caught violating them. With rare exceptions,
the mood was paternalistic, though the governing attitudes and be-
havioral patterns ranged from the stern authoritarianism of the sec-
tarian institutions to the more lenient and permissive "boys will be
boys" attitude of many larger colleges and universities. In both
kinds of institutions, however, there was apt to be little concern for
the form or inherent fairness of disciplinary proceedings, and even
less thought given to the purposes of punishment. The stern parent
wanted the offender to pay. There was Jovian anger in the more
primitive institutions if a student dared to write an offensive article
in the school paper, criticize the competence of instructors, offend the
curfew regulations, drink alcoholic beverages on campus, or behave
in a disorderly manner in public. Tolerant institutions, however,
allowed drinking in rooms, imposed generous curfew rules, if any,
and allowed minor offenses to go largely unnoticed.
With the abandonment of the in loco parentis model, there has
been a search underway to find more acceptable principles of gov-
ernance within the academic community in light of contemporary
changes in student-institutional relations. 7  For the student, the cul-
mination of this endeavor is the formulation of rules of greater
specificity and the adoption of fairer disciplinary procedural schemes.
It is with this latter topic that this article is chiefly concerned, al-
though the problems that arise in formulating procedures have an
obvious relationship to answers given to larger questions concerning
the goals and the governance of the university.
The legal system is relevant to the problem of developing fair
disciplinary proceedings in two obvious ways. First, a plethora of
court decisions in recent years has firmly implanted the constitutional
requirement of procedural due process on the university campus.
Second, in fashioning new procedural schemes many institutions
have transplanted some of the elements that due process imposes on
judicial and formal administrative hearings. The result is that uni-
versity disciplinary proceedings now have the aura of adversary hear-
ings.
7 In a previous article, one of the authors noted that reorientation of student-insti-
tutional relations has been manifested by the students' demands for greater participation
in the decision making processes and for an elevation in status as members of the aca-
demic community. Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DEN. L.J.
511, 512 n.5 (1968).
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II. COURT-DEFINED STANDARDS
There is now available a sufficiently revealing body of judicial
decisions to permit generalizations concerning the courts' role in
reviewing disciplinary actions. In general, the courts have addressed
themselves to two aspects of due process at the university level.
The first issue frequently explored by the courts is whether the
language of a rule of conduct is overly broad. It has been held
that due process requires that a rule be sufficiently specific to enable
the student to reasonably understand what is proscribed.8 Hence, a
rule prohibiting and penalizing "misconduct" is deficient insofar as
it leaves university administrators complete discretion in defining the
term, without giving students the slightest hint of what is forbidden.
But on the whole, courts have generally declined to subject univer-
sity rules to the same critical analysis to which criminal statutes are
subjected.
The second and more prevalent issue litigated in the courts is
whether the disciplinary procedures comport with the requirements of
due process. Practically all courts agree that for serious charges, car-
rying a penalty of probation, suspension, or expulsion, the student
should be given notice of the charges and a hearing at which the
university is required to present evidence of the violation and the
student is given an opportunity to refute the evidence or justify his
conduct.' Whether other elements associated with a criminal pro-
ceeding are required, such as right to counsel, right to a public hear-
ing, right to confrontation and cross-examination, right to introduce
favorable testimony, privilege against self-incrimination, right to a
transcript, and right to appeal, has not been unanimously settled by
the courts."0 Some courts simply refuse to rely on the adversarial
elements of a criminal trial as a model for a university hearing."
The underlying rationale is usually a policy consideration: The edu-
cational process should remain relatively free from judicial interfer-
ence and from the imposition of adversarial procedures which di-
minish the cooperative relationship between institution and student.
8 Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1969), aff'g 295 F. Supp.
978 (W.D. Wis. 1968). Contra, Norton v. Disdpline Comm., 419 F.2d 195, 200
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970); Esteban v. Central Mo. State Col-
lege, 290 F. Supp. 622, 630 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
) E.g., Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D. Wis.
1969); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
10 See Note, Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of Law
and Practice, 1970 DuKE L.J. 763.
11 See Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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Other courts, although acknowledging the policy against incorpora-
tion of criminal procedures, have tested their applicability in terms
of what due process requires in each university context.
An example of the latter judicial involvement is the case of
French v. Bashful, 2 in which a federal district court examined the
student's right to counsel under a due process analysis. The court
outlined the due process test as follows: "[Djetermine and balance
the nature of the private interest affected and of the government
interest involved, taking account of history and the precise cir-
cumstances surrounding the case at hand."'" Applying this analy-
tical framework to the case, the court found that the students should
have been allowed counsel, notwithstanding authority to the con-
trary. 4 The court reasoned that the valuable nature of the right to
education and the relative seriousness of the possible punishment -
probation, suspension, or expulsion - warranted greater procedural
safeguards. The presence of counsel would add much greater reli-
ability to the guilt-determining process. In addition, there appar-
ently was no overriding governmental interest involved in French
that would militate against the imposition of the counsel require-
ment. Finally, the circumstances of that case were unique in that a
law student had conducted the prosecution of the case at the uni-
versity hearing. Thus, it was only fair to allow the students also to
be represented by someone with legal training.
Despite the lack of unanimity among courts on what procedures
due process specifically requires, the thrust of the decisions is against
dearly arbitrary or one-sided actions by the institution in response to
an alleged violation of a university rule.' 5 But as yet the courts have
not considered all the aspects of a disciplinary hearing. For instance,
they have not delved into the fairness and consistency of the univer-
sity's decision to initiate a hearing. Nor has the nature, number, or
neutrality of the triers of fact received judicial scrutiny. Whether a
student is entitled to discovery of the facts against him prior to the
hearing also remains unanswered. Even where the courts have
spoken, they have not fully explored some of the issues in great de-
12 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed per curiam, 425 F.2d 182
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970).
3 Id. at 1338, quoting Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1967).
14 See Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1028 (1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cit. 1967).
1 See, e.g., Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
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tail. Although the right to a hearing is universally acknowledged, 16
whether the form of the proceedings should be adversarial, admin-
istrative, or inquisitorial is left to the discretion of the university as
are the rules governing the conduct of the hearing.
From the existing body of decisions certain questions arise con-
cerning the courts' role in reviewing disciplinary proceedings. For
instance, why have courts up to this point shown an indisposition
toward dose scrutiny of all facets of the disciplinary process? And
an equally appropriate question is why the courts have chosen to
intervene to the extent that they have already? One can perhaps
answer both questions by pointing first to other areas where the
courts initially adhered to a policy of abstention. A classic example
is the evolution of judicial supervision over pretrial activities of
the police. Courts initially took a modest view of their supervi-
sory powers, excluding obviously coerced confessions17 or evidence
seized in dear violation of the 14th amendment's due process dause.' 8
But as the frequency and seriousness of police misconduct was re-
vealed, the judiciary pushed further into the thicket of police be-
havior, expanding the scope and meaning of due process. From the
requirements of Miranda warnings 9 and the presence of counsel at
lineups2" to the body of search and seizure rules,2 ' the upshot has
been a wide range of procedural formalities engrafted upon the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. Yet having gone so far, the courts
still refrain from a realistic examination of the plea bargaining pro-
cess, which obviates the need for trials in 85 percent of the cases.
Here the courts call a halt, perhaps in order to save their own system
from complete collapse and demise.
In other areas the courts have been reluctant to intervene because
of the complexity of the issues and the difficulty of fashioning ef-
fective remedies, as in intraunion labor disputes. Frequently, the
courts' hands-off policy reflects 4 conscious decision that the legisla-
16See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
17 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
18See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
29 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 0 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1961); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
21 Summaries of the Supreme Court search and seizure cases of the past decade are
collected in THE CRIMINAL LAW REvOLUTIoN 1960-1969 (Eds. of The Criminal Law
Reporter 1969).
2 2 See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1050-51 (1951).
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ture is the better equipped and more appropriate branch for resolving
societal conflict, as in problems arising within employer-employee
relationships.' In still other areas, courts remain aloof because of
the desirability of maintaining large segments of economic and so-
cial life free from external restraint and control. This last reason
in large part explains why the universities have historically been free
from close judicial scrutiny. Courts may fear that a university's au-
thority and autonomy would erode if they, without hesitancy, re-
viewed the decisions of school officials.2' By the same token, the
courts have accepted on faith the expertise and infallibility of edu-
cators in formulating essential regulations that are reasonably re-
lated to the educational process.25
There is, of course, no guarantee that the courts will continue to
be satisfied with only minimal due process safeguards in university
disciplinary proceedings. But there is reason to believe that judges
would hardly welcome the flood of litigation that would follow a
clearly signaled determination to impose a full scale adversarial
model on the university.
Even if we grant that courts should remain alert to infringe-
ments of first amendment rights, it can be argued that intensive judi-
cial scrutiny of university disciplinary procedures is probably not a
wise objective.26  The judicial proceeding places the parties in ad-
versary positions, pitting university against student. A feeling of
support and joint participation, which ought to pervade the relation-
ship between university and student, is thus displaced by a feeling
of hostility. And after the court has ruled, there is the risk that
this hostility will accompany the parties as they return to the cam-
pus. Once adapted to the adversarial atmosphere of the courtroom,
the university is likely to be more hardnose and less sympathetic to
the student who has imposed on it the burden and expense of liti-
gation. Where the student is victorious in court and the university
is perhaps grudgingly saddled with yet one more procedural require-
ment, the possibility of rapprochment becomes far removed. All in
2 3 See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), overruled, Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770, 398 U.S. 235, 258 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
2 4 Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1151-52
(1968).
2 5 See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 709-11, 212 N.E.2d 468,
472-73 (1965).
26 See, e.g., Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala.
1967), vacated and remanded, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968); Hammond v. South Caro-
lina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
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all, the very act of going to court, regardless of the legal outcome,
seems to indelibly taint student-university relations.
A second problem of judicial interference is that the court offers
only a limited, "win-or-lose" resolution of the problem. A decision
is generally open and shut in the sense that it either affirms or
reverses the suspension. Rarely are any alternatives offered or any
new guidelines laid down. Indeed, this may be the greatest disad-
vantage of judicial review. In the case of affirmance, the univer-
sity feels that if its procedures have withstood judicial review they
are adequate to guarantee a fair and impartial hearing. In the case
of reversal, where can the university go to improve its procedures?
Unfortunately, courts cannot offer much help to the university seek-
ing to establish adequate due process standards.
Part of the reason why the courts cannot blueprint comprehen-
sive disciplinary procedures that accommodate and protect the in-
terests of university and student alike is that they are too far re-
moved from campus life to offer any real help or understanding; they
lack information necessary for resolving the shortcomings in univer-
sity procedures. Furthermore, the university itself is a more effi-
dent forum for resolving these problems in terms of resources and
interest. Coupled with the judiciary's lack of expertise in this area
is a conceptual problem: The student-institutional relationship has
successfully defied legal classification. The courts were comfortable
with in loco parentis, and the fact remains that some schools still
are, and want to be, surrogate parents. Other universities feel ex-
actly the opposite. This baffles the courts to some extent as to what
legal standards should be applied.
Equally as difficult is the judisdictional problem created by the
private universities. In applying constitutional standards to the state
university, the federal courts have had little difficulty in finding the
requisite state action.27  The private university, however, is a
jurisdictional "no man's land." ' Thus, it is understandable that the
courts are reluctant to pitch themselves into this undefinable, un-
charted area. Nevertheless, the same problems occur in private and
2 7 See, e.g., Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
2 8 Compare Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858
(E.D. La. 1962) (Wright, J.), with Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80-83 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J.), afg 294 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.N.Y.). See Coleman v. Wagner College,
429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969);
O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALo L. REv. 155 (1970). See
also Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct.), rei'd on
other grounds, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd =ex., 12 N.Y.2d 802,
187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
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public institutions. Students are expelled on hazy grounds, rules are
vague, and proceedings are less than adequate.
Aside from the ill feelings engendered by a trip to the courthouse
and the limitations, both theoretical and practical, that pervade judi-
cial intervention, there still remains a question concerning the due
process analysis used by many courts. Despite repeated statements
that they are against imposing an adversarial model on university
proceedings, courts cannot help but look to the elements of criminal
procedure for direction. In addition, in arguing for greater reliabil-
ity in the factfinding process, attorneys representing students will
naturally try to analogize the university procedure to formal criminal
procedure. Thus, the courts' energies are spent on determining
whether a particular procedural guarantee should be carried over to
the university. The result is twofold. First, with each incorpora-
tion, the university proceeding becomes more adversarial. The uni-
versity and student begin to think and act as participants in a crimi-
nal proceeding. Sacrificed in the process is a sense of academic
community, and in its place is substituted a feeling of hostility and
alienation. The squaring-off of administration and student also
places the faculty in an awkward position. As the disciplinary hear-
ings become more adversarial, the faculty is forced to choose sides.
The faculty members become mere witnesses in support of either the
university or the student. Ideally, however, the faculty should not
have to make such a decision; rather it should be free to contribute
its own ideas and advice in equitably resolving the conflict. A sec-
ond effect of the incorporation of criminal procedure is a smothering
of creative efforts by the university to design procedures that en-
hance the factfinding process and at the same time perserve a concili-
atory and rehabilitative relationship between school and student.
There is a danger that universities will settle on providing only the
minimum requirements of due process. Conditioned by the courts
to think in terms of what criminal law requires, they will be less
inclined to formulate innovative procedural models which could be
both nonadversarial and fair to the individual.
Admittedly, the French v. Bashful29 court, in analyzing the
right to counsel in terms of due process, fairly balanced the more
tangible interests involved. It adequately protected both the stu-
dent's interest in a reliable factfinding process and the university's
29 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed per zuriam, 425 F.2d 182
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970) (discussed in text accompanying notes
12-14 supra).
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interest in minimizing the burden and cost of the disciplinary process.
But as the preceding discussion noted, due process often cannot ade-
quately protect that intangible interest that both student and institu-
tion share: the sense of academic community. Although certain dr-
cumstances may justify the carryover of an element of criminal pro-
cedure, the inevitable result is a move one step closer to a formal
adversary proceeding. The sense of community among members of
a university is a fragile item. As the disciplinary proceedings be-
come more adversarial, there is the great risk that it will be shat-
tered. Instead of the university's being concerned with what is best
for both itself and the student, it will primarily be concerned with
"convicting" the student.
III. THE BARRIERs To UNVERSiTy-DEFINED PROCEDURES
If the solution to the problem of fair disciplinary proceedings
cannot be satisfactorily resolved by the courts, it will be necessary
either to resort to an adjudicative body apart from both the courts
and the universities or to seek a better solution from the university
itself. It is not difficult to conceive of an extra-university body that
would hear and dispose of university disciplinary cases. We are all
well aware, for example, of the great success of arbitration in resolv-
ing disputes in the commercial world. In cases where university-
student relations have become embittered, or where mutual confi-
dence is lacking, it may be wise to recognize that there is an
inadequate basis of trust and good will for constructing satisfactory
procedures within the university. A suggested alternative is the for-
mation of a three-man board, composed of a student representative, a
representative of the faculty and administration, and a third individ-
ual selected by the other two. This board would hear all university
complaints bearing a designated degree of penalty and decide the
cases within a specified time. Members would serve for a designated
term with salaries paid equally by student fees and the university.
The same model could be adopted by both private and public uni-
versities. A virtue of this approach, apart from insuring a reason-
ably impartial proceeding, is that it would mitigate the tensions en-
gendered where the university officials serve both as chief prosecutor
and principal trier of facts.
For a number of reasons, however, educational institutions will
probably not choose to adopt such a scheme. First of all, it can be
interpreted as a confession of an institution's failure to win its stu-
dents' confidence. Next, it will add to costs, although this factor
19711
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seems least significant. There may also be serious difficulty in con-
vincing qualified persons to accept board positions. And because
the proceeding would be out of university control, it would seem-
ingly afford little opportunity for effective resoulution of a matter
short of a final decision. Finally, this board proposal will probably
be rejected simply because it is a solution contrary to historical and
current views of the educational enterprise - that is, that a univer-
sity's responsibility to a student extends beyond mere education.
We are left then with the university as the principal guarantor
of fairness in disciplinary proceedings. From the student viewpoint,
there are reasons for doubting whether any large scale improve-
ment in the university's performance of this role is possible. By
and large, most universities have indicated that they are not insti-
tuting the necessary procedural safeguards to give the student his
"due process." Part of the reason for this failure lies in the rapid
evolution of new roles for the university and the student in today's
society.
Universities have changed in size, shape, number, and impor-
tance. Similarly, the student population has substantially increased
in number, mobility, age, interest, and affluence. The modern uni-
versity has the growth pattern and the massive impersonality of a
large scale organization. As a result it has assumed many of the
characteristics of big business, resulting in a loss of a parental con-
cern for the student as an individual. Today the university is simply
not a surrogate parent. It cannot afford to completely supply its
students with housing and food. It cannot monitor their hours,
morals, or personal problems. The modern university has neither
the time, the money, the skilled personnel, nor the desire to under-
take such tasks. Moreover, students today are more mature, more
independent, more self-supporting and participate more fully in
society than in past years. Thus, to a large degree, both the univer-
sity and the student have outgrown the traditional relationship of
parent and child.
The university's changing role is further evidenced by the fact
that today education is very much a business.30 The university must
grapple with the problems of raising revenue, and its survival de-
pends largely upon shrewd investments in stock and real estate and
securing government loans and research grants. To a large extent,
30 Cf. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459, 465-66 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
the business of running a university is as important as the educa-
tion the university furnishes. Consequently, attention is more often
focused on the financial end of the educational process than on
providing procedural safeguards. Procedures for financing are much
better planned and thought out than procedures for handling dis-
ciplinary problems. Callous though it sounds, the economic impact
of losing a student or two is considerably less than losing a grant or
two.
Thus, establishing procedural fairness falls low on the list of
university priorities. Many existing rules are codifications of pre-
formulated, nonspecific, and often wholly unrealistic standards.
When conflict involving student dissenters arises, the university often
feels confronted by disloyal subjects who, if not disposed of quickly
and effectively, will mushroom into a force capable of jeopardizing
the smooth operation of the institution. Its natural reaction is to
exercise its disciplinary authority in summary fashion, with empha-
sis on swiftness.
The university's handling of the whole student discipline area
is directly contrary to its traditional image. Rarely does any institu-
tion in the scheme of American ideals find itself in as favorable a
position in dealing with its members as the university in its initial
relations with students. There is a preconceived notion that the uni-
versity is a source of truth and justice, striving for fairness in all
that it does. Where the university demonstrates that that initial pre-
conception comports with reality, the whole educational process is
enhanced. But the university has too often endangered its position
in the eyes of the students through its inattention to principles of
justice and fair play. It may well be that unless it fashions proce-
dural safeguards to insure fundamental justice, the university will
soon lose its favorable presumption.
The essential question is: Can the university by a reorientation
of its structure provide a disciplinary process that is both effective
and fair, one that protects legitimate interests of the institution while
serving as a model for a just resolution of a disputed question? The
authors suggest an affirmative answer. Some of the ways of achiev-
ing this objective are set forth below.
IV. THE SHAPING OF A FAIR PROCEEDING
If, as concluded above, we cannot rely on judicially determined
criteria of due process to ensure fair disciplinary proceedings, how
1971]
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should educational institutions proceed in developing procedures that
promise substantial justice?
A number of assumptions should underlie any search for justice
through disciplinary proceedings. First, there should be a warm and
cooperative attitude toward students on the part of faculty and ad-
ministrative officials. Students, of course, would have to recipro-
cate. Next, it must be remembered that a university's principal
function is education. The stimulation of the desire to learn and
the inculcation of desired mental traits and skills in its students,
many of whom will be the intellectual, political, and economic lead-
ers of their generation, necessarily has a significant place within this
aspect of the university's design. Thus, the disciplinary procedure,
like any other facet of academic life, must be judged in light of its
tendency to advance or retard achievement of these educational
goals. The involvement of students, faculty, and administration
in determining the justice and efficacy of jointly adopted procedures
offers a lesson in both the meaning and realization of justice. In
addition, such a combined effort can favorably influence the partici-
pants' reaction to the totality of university goals and norms of be-
havior. It would be a supreme irony if institutions were to construe
the hands-off attitude of courts as an invitation to observe only the
rudiments of justice and largely ignore its substance.
The formal elements of a disciplinary procedure founded upon a
set of ideas, values, and normative principles reflect the way the in-
stitution views its mission. They also reflect the relationship
among all the active participants in the university. The extent to
which these rules, codes, and regulations result from a consensus
of both senior and junior partners, as opposed to a body of strictures
imposed by the former upon the latter, will greatly increase the likeli-
hood of fair proceedings in practice.
If there is a basic feeling of partnership and mutual trust among
university participants, the number of commandments directed
against the students will be fewer. Instead, alternative means of
enforcement may be developed, such as student enforcement of dor-
mitory regulations. It could also be made clear to students that the
laws of the surrounding community will apply; violations of nar-
cotics laws, for instance, would be handled by formal legal proceed-
ings. Where an institution seeks to develop and maintain trust
within its ranks, it can safely reexamine the need for rules at any
time. Whenever appropriate, it can declare itself free of the rule-
imposing function.
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Where rules are promulgated, however, they should be reasonably
explicit. Thus far only a few courts have invalidated university
regulations on the ground of vagueness.3 1 A basic notion of justice
is that rules must be set forth as dearly as possible so that conduct
may be shaped accordingly. But rules do not have to be so tightly
drawn that their effectiveness is limited. We have the ancient legal
offenses of "disorderly conduct" and "breach of peace" precisely be-
cause it is impossible to define the almost infinite variety of dis-
orderly human behavior. The dangers of using overly general regu-
lations against harmless, albeit unconventional, behavior, however,
has become increasingly evident where public school officials have
moved to punish students for such things as their clothing or their
hair styles.32
One way of making rules sufficiently explicit is to specify exam-
ples of disorderly conduct, particularly conduct which clearly in-
hibits the educational process. A few examples are disobeying a
lawful order of a university official or officer of the law, disrupting
classrooms or study halls, or making unreasonable noise that prevents
carrying out the university's educational functions. Similarly, a uni-
versity is entitled to lay down reasonable conditions covering the
time, place, and manner of student demonstrations. These would in-
dude standards of cause for invoking disciplinary actions against any
serious violation. And once rules are adopted, a good deal of at-
tention should be directed toward establishing an effective system
for informing all students of the rules, particularly those rules gov-
erning activities in which students are most likely to engage un-
wittingly.
In short, the argument here is based on the desirability of evolv-
ing a body of written rules and regulations, by a joint effort of all
university citizens, which would provide as much specificity as pos-
sible. Interpretations by authorized university officials should flesh
out the bare bones of the rules with the goal of achieving reasonable
regulations that will give adequate notice to potentially affected per-
sons. These rules and regulations should be reexamined periodically
and amended whenever desirable or necessary. Changes in the
31E.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969), aff'g 295 F. Supp. 978
(W.D. Wis. 1968).
32 See, e.g., Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970) (school regulation
that dothing and grooming are not to be of "extreme style and fashion" held unconsti-
tutionally vague); Myers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d 549,
75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (high school dress policy stating that extremes
of hair styles were not acceptable held unconstitutional).
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substantive rules should be made through a process of negotiation
or arbitration.
The next important consideration is the factors surrounding the
decision to invoke a disciplinary proceeding. First of all, there must
be a consensus on a philosophy and method for setting in motion
whatever disciplinary procedures are to be used - the equivalent of
filing charges in a criminal proceeding. The designation of those
empowered to invoke the process will depend upon the serious-
ness of the offense and the extent to which the disciplinary function
has been delegated to students and other nonadministrative person-
nel. We are already familiar with honor code violations where stu-
dents invoke the procedure and with dormitory judicial councils in
which students play a similar rold. Where mixed disciplinary boards
or committees are adopted, a member of the administration, typi-
cally a dean of students, usually initiates the action. At that point
the following questions should be considered: What are the proper
concerns of an officer of the university in this role? Should he be
concerned with public opinion or how the alumni will react? Is
deterence of others the primary consideration? Is it relevant that
the alleged offense has outraged the faculty? Are other students
endangered by this breach of rules? Are there well considered
gradations of administrative action short of filing a charge against a
student? It is easy to conclude that a system of disciplinary action
based on the mutual interests of the institution and the student is
the only system that deserves support. But in the real world, these
are not always the only interests involved; instead, broader interests,
as suggested above, might well influence the university's decisions
respecting disciplinary actions.
Assuming that the process will be invoked on certain occasions,
the question of how prosecutional discretion is to be exercised be-
comes critical, and no categorical answer is available. It is sug-
gested that no single officer should be solely responsible for work-
ing out the policy, and that the actual administration of declared
policy should be reviewed from time to time. The individual re-
sponsible for bringing charges should have a series of graded options
open to him. If an alleged violator's continued presence in the uni-
versity community poses no danger to himself or others, a reprimand
or warning may be sufficient; depending on the facts and circum-
stances, administrative penalties such as a fine, restitution, or with-
drawal of a privilege may be more appropriate. Where an offense
is repeated, formal disciplinary proceedings may be appropriate.
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Where the offense is serious, the first two options might be bypassed
and a formal hearing immediately convened. The important point
is that the decision to discipline should not be made on an arbitrary
basis. Rather, it should reflect a reasoned policy that those who
have violated a significant rule should be charged.
Moving beyond the decision to charge, there is the question of
the appropriate hearing mechanism for matters not handled through
a purely administrative process. _Although it is not wise to insist
on a fixed structure for this board or on any one set of procedural
rules, a few suggestions seem relevant.
First, the factfinding should be kept distinct from the sanction-
ing process. This would protect the' student from the problem
created where the two functions are merged: the imposition of pun-
ishment by a person qualified to find facts but lacking the neces-
sary wisdom for disposing of the'case. One possible solution is a
bifurcated hearing, but this seems excessively awkward and time-
consuming. At the very least, however, the board should be in-
doctrinated as to the absolute necessity of maintaining a separation
between factfinding and sanctioning.
Additional considerations are the kind of person needed to fill
the important position of chairman of the board, and the question
of the chairman's duties. It is suggested that the chairman be a
well-qualified, nonuniversity person, possibly selected by agreement
between the students and the administration. Such a chairman need
not be a practicing attorney; he might be an experienced negotiator
or arbitrator. As the presiding officer, he would have the responsi-
bility of laying out the ground rules in each proceeding, of exten-
sively questioning the witnesses, of protecting the witnesses against
unfair treatment, and of making a summary record of the proceed-
ings. In short, he would be charged with fully developing all the
facts of the case.
Another consideration is what place, if any, is there in the hear-
ing for representatives of the institution and the person charged?
If a competent and independent hearing officer presides, there is no
need for a prosecutor or defense counsel. But if the institution has
a designated representative, the alleged offender should have equally
capable assistance. The undesirable situation that often prevails is
that the institution typically has a more or less experienced spokes-
man, while the student has none. If each side has a special repre-
sentative, each representative should perform his functions under the
direction of the presiding officer. It should be made clear to each
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that his purpose is to assist in developing the truth and reaching a
fair disposition of the case.
There are a number of other considerations involved in the hear-
ing. Legal rules of evidence need not be followed, but there ought
to be an orderly process for developing the facts, with variations per-
mitted to facilitate a just result. For example, if a statement by a
security officer is germane to the resolution of the issue, he should
give his version in the presence of the alleged offender and then
should be subject to cross-examination. Similarly, where witnesses
are needed to assist the defense, the board should assume respon-
sibility for insuring their presence. The test with respect to adopt-
ing any procedural device is whether it is essential to a fair hearing
and disposition of the matter. It is on these grounds that the al-
leged offender should always be given adequate notice of charges in
sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense and to present
mitigating factors. The student might well be given the option of
a hearing open to the university community, with the proviso that
any spectators must remain orderly.
Finally there should be an appeal channel for a review of both
the facts and the sanctions. The appellate tribunal, however, would
not have authority to impose or increase a penalty contrary to the
conclusions of the hearing board. And effective review would re-
quire that the record be sufficient to determine whether there was
prejudicial error, such as insufficient proof.
The emphasis at the hearing should be on achieving justice for
those against whom an institution finds it necessary to bring charges
in order to vindicate a principle or a rule designed to protect all
those who participate in its activities. The procedures should re-
flect an acceptance of principles associated with the concept of jus-
tice, though not necessarily those attached to the concept of an ad-
versary proceeding. Justice to the individual and to the institution
is more likely to result from a well-conducted, nonadversary pro-
ceeding, where the emphasis is not only on obtaining full informa-
tion, but also on meting out penalties with the compassion that most
university offenders merit. In certain cases, justice may require the
ultimate penalty - severance from the academic community. But
the philosophy behind the proceeding should be one that concen-
trates on educating and warning the offender, and convincing him
that being a good university citizen is in itself a worthwhile ideal.
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V. CONCLUSION
Amid the current challenges directed against institutional power
and the demands that that power be exercised in a fair manner, it
is an appropriate time for universities to reassess their policies and
procedures respecting student discipline. Although the university
may feel a sense of security in adopting procedural requirements
prescribed by the courts, reliance on judicially prescribed procedures
alone may not insure that the optimal interests of the student and
the university are served in disciplinary actions, for the reasons dis-
cussed above. As an alternative to adopting minimal court-defined
standards, however, universities might look beyond judicial require-
ments and under the guidelines suggested herein, establish dis-
ciplinary policies and procedures which will more adequately serve
the interests of all parties involved. Admittedly, the latter approach
to student discipline may not be attainable in larger universities
where, amid the "big business" of education, the total fairness and
objectives of disciplinary actions have been irretrievably relegated
to secondary importance. It is still possible, however, for the many
universities which are not completely absorbed in operational ex-
igencies to take affirmative steps to insure that their disciplinary poli-
cies and procedures are attuned with their ultimate goal - the
education of students, who are, indeed, the universities' most pre-
cious commodity.
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